Richins Drilling v. Tuhaye : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Richins Drilling v. Tuhaye : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gail E. Laser; Tesch Law Offices; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
John R. Lund; P. Matthew Cox; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Richins Drilling v. Tuhaye, No. 20060955 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6894
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




TUHAYE, L.L.C., A UTAH LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, AND GOLF 
SERVICE GROUP, INC., A UTAH 
CORPORATION 
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES. 
CASE NO. 20060955 
DISTRICT CT. NO. 020500464 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE DEREK P. PULLAN 
JOHN R. LUND 
P. MATTHEW COX 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE: (801) 52i-™nn 
GAIL E. LASER 
BRADLEY J. NEESE 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
314 MAIN STREET, SUITE 200 
POST OFFICE BOX 3390 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 





IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHINS DRILLING, INC., A UTAH 
CORPORATION, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, 
TUHAYE, L.L.C., A UTAH LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, AND GOLF 
SERVICE GROUP, INC., A UTAH 
CORPORATION 
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES. 
CASE NO. 20060955 
DISTRICT CT. NO. 020500464 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE DEREK P. PULLAN 
JOHN R. LUND 
P. MATTHEW COX 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
GAIL E. LASER 
BRADLEY J. NEESE 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
314 MAIN STREET, SUITE 200 
POST OFFICE BOX 3390 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 




Appellant/Plaintiff Richins Drilling, Inc. ("Richins Drilling") sued 
Appellees/Defendants Golf Services Group, Inc. ("Golf Services") and Tuhaye, L.L.C. 
("Tuhaye") in Fourth Judicial District Court, in Wasatch County, State of Utah, seeking 
to recover alleged amounts due under a drilling contract. After trial, Judge Derek P. 
Pullan entered judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees and awarded Defendant Golf 
Services, as the prevailing party, $103,614.23 in attorney's fees. Richins Drilling 
thereafter appealed the trial court's entry of judgment. 
Defendants High Country Title and Does 1-25 did not participate at trial and are 
not parties to this appeal. 
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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendants dispute Plaintiff/Appellant's contention that it properly preserved the 
issue of the trial court's interpretation of the Release of All Counterclaims, as discussed 
more fully in Section III and IV of the Argument below. Because Plaintiff failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal, the trial court's decision must be affirmed. 
Additionally, the decision as to the amount of attorney's fees to award is subject to 
an abuse of discretion standard. Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, % 53, 158 P.3d 562. 
Finally, Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the 
contract and the mechanic's lien statute, if they prevail on this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Beginning in early 2002, Appellees/Defendants Golf Services - a golf course 
designer and installer, and Tuhaye - a developer in Wasatch County, enlisted Plaintiff 
Richins Drilling to drill a public culinary well, to be used initially to irrigate the newly-
laid golf course. That spring, Defendants regularly paid Richins Drilling's invoices - a 
total amount paid of $465,462.55 (a figure well over Plaintiffs own estimate of the cost 
of drilling the entire well). However, by July, when it became painfully clear - as the 
newly-laid sod was dying - that Richins Drilling was overwhelmed by the project and 
lacked the ability to finish the well, that Richins Drilling had significantly overcharged 
Defendants, and that the project had been unreasonably prolonged, Defendants 
terminated Richins Drilling and hired another driller who finished the well (in which 
there had been no progress for fully six weeks) in just three days. Defendants then 
refused to pay the single outstanding Richins Drilling invoice of $76,670.34. 
Richins Drilling sued for that outstanding balance, and Defendants 
counterclaimed, asserting, inter alia, that the time that Richins Drilling spent on the 
project (four months) was unreasonable, excessive and far exceeded industry standards 
and that Plaintiff failed to use the "reverse rotary" method of drilling, resulting in 
Plaintiff billing Defendant an excessive and unreasonable amount. 
Shortly before trial, the parties settled the counterclaim and the counterclaim was 
dismissed with prejudice with each party to pay their own costs and attorney's fees. 
On May 16, 2005, the case proceeded to a four-day trial, after which the trial court 
found in favor of Defendants on all causes of action, finding, inter alia, that (i) Richins 
Drilling had materially breached the contract between the parties for failure to perform, 
thereby excusing performance by Defendants, (ii) Richins Drilling's mechanic's lien 
claim fails because Defendants had already compensated Richins Drilling far in excess of the 
value of the labor performed, and (iii) therefore, Defendant Golf Services, as the 
"prevailing party," was entitled pursuant to statute to recover reasonable attorney's fees, to 
be determined by the court. 
Thereafter, counsel for Defendants submitted a number of affidavits in support of 
attorney's fees and costs including one that specifically differentiated between fees 
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incurred for successful claims and claims for which there is no entitlement to fees (the 
counterclaim). 
On May 1, 2006, the trial court issued a ruling that the attorney's fees sought by 
Golf Services were reasonable and adequately allocated to successful claims and claims 
for which no entitlement existed. On September 18, 2006, the trial court entered 
judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded Defendant Golf Services, as the prevailing 
party under the contract, $103,614.23 in attorney's fees and expenses. On October 18, 
2006, Plaintiff Richins Drilling filed its Notice of Appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
A. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
Defendant Tuhaye contracted with Defendant Golf Services to construct a golf 
course in conjunction with a residential development on property in Wasatch County 
overlooking the Jordanelle Reservoir. (R. 595). Golf Services in turn hired Plaintiff 
Richins Drilling to drill a water well. Id. 
In November 2002, Marty Ostronic, Vice President of Golf Services, and LeeRoy 
Farrell, a representative of Tuhaye, first met with Kerry Richins (President and owner, 
with his wife, of Richins Drilling) and inquired as to whether Richins Drilling could drill 
the well on the Tuhaye property. (R. 594, 596). At this initial meeting, Ostronic 
explained that the well would serve two purposes—irrigation of the golf course and a 
1
 Significant portions of the facts as detailed herein are a reiteration of the June 15, 
2005 ruling (the "Ruling") made by the trial court. A full copy of the Ruling can be 
found at R. 579 through R. 596 and is attached to the Brief of Appellant as "Addendum 
A.5' 
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public water supply, and that Golf Services needed the well completed by the first part of 
May so that the golf course could be seeded and watered. (R. 594). Those parties met 
again on two or three occasions to discuss the project, at one of which Kerry Richins and 
Golf Services discussed different methods of drilling and reached certain agreements as 
follows: 
1. The specifications drafted by witness Van King, a hydrogeologist for the 
project's engineering firm, StanTech, called for use of the flooded-reverse-
circulation, rotary drilling method. Id. Richins Drilling and Golf Services 
agreed that Richins could use the conventional direct rotary method to drill the 
first 800 feet of the well. (R. 593).3 
2. Richins Drilling and Golf Services agreed that below 800 feet in the water 
production zone, Richins would use either (i) the direct rotary method, using 
air or a polymer foam instead of bentonite to lift out the cuttings, or (ii) the 
flooded-reverse-circulation method. Id. 
2
 This method requires use of a rig consisting of concentric tubes. Id. As the 
drilling proceeds, air is forced down the outer tube creating a vacuum, which lifts 
the cuttings up the inner tube. Id. The cuttings never come in contact with the 
walls of the hole. Id. Bentonite (also called "mud") is forced between the outer 
tube and the wall of the hole to stabilize the formations. (R. 593-94). 
3
 The conventional direct rotary method requires that some substance—air, 
polymer foam, or bentonite—be forced in the bore-hole. Id. As drilling proceeds, 
the cuttings mix with this substance and are forced up and out of the hole. Id. The 
bentonite or foam has direct contact with the walls of the hole. Id. 
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3. Kerry Richins specifically was asked and he represented to Golf Services that 
he had the experience and the resources to use the flooded-reverse-circulation 
method. Id. 
Kerry Richins was the party who prepared the contract which would govern the 
drilling of the well, and it was executed on February 26, 2002.4 (R. 592). The contract 
provided that Golf Services would engage Richins Drilling "as an Independent 
Contractor to drill the.. .well in search of water on an hourly, time and material basis." 
(R. 592; R. 694, Addendum B to Brief of Appellant).5 The contract permitted the parties 
to adopt detailed specifications for drilling methods and practices and referenced an 
Exhibit A, attached to the contract, containing these specifications. (R. 591; R. 691, 
Addendum B to Brief of Appellant, % 9). 
Under the contract, Richins Drilling had a duty to perform the work "in 
accordance with the generally accepted practices and methods customary in the industry." 
(R. 591; R. 688, Addendum B to Brief of Appellant, If 19.1). In the event that formations 
were encountered during the drilling process that made "drilling abnormally difficult or 
hazardous, caused sticking of the drill pipe or casing, or other difficulty which precludes 
drilling ahead under reasonably normal procedures," Richins Drilling was obligated to 
exert "every reasonable effort to overcome such difficulty," and Golf Services would 
assume the risk of loss or damage to Richins Drilling's equipment in the hole. (R. 591; 
4
 A full copy of the contract can be found at R. 681 through R. 694 and is attached 
to Brief of Appellant as "Addendum B." 
5
 This was in contrast to some drilling contracts that instead charged on a "per 
foot" basis. 
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R. 688, Addendum B to Brief of Appellant, f^ 19.2). Golf Services was required to post a 
deposit equal to 10% of the estimated total cost of the drilling; Richins Drilling estimated 
that cost at $370,000.00, and Golf Services posted a deposit of $37,000.00. (R. 590; R. 
692, Addendum B to Brief of Appellant, ^ 5). 
Richins Drilling commenced work on March 5, 2002. (R. 590). On May 9, 2002, 
66 days into the project, Richins Drilling installed the 26-inch casing and phase two of 
the well was complete to 800 feet. (R. 590, 592). However, from May 10, 2002 to May 
21, 2002, Richins Drilling performed no work on the project — Kerry Richins testified 
that he took a vacation, but he also believed that Golf Services was not paying invoices 
timely. (R. 590). Work commenced on the hole on May 22, 2002, one day after Golf 
Services paid $84,275.67 to Richins Drilling. (R. 589). Yet, there was no clear evidence 
that Golf Services was in fact delinquent in payments. Id. 
Then, from May 22 until June 11, 2002, Richins Drilling made little progress on 
the well - only 171 feet. Id. While multiple repairs on the equipment further delayed the 
work, the primary cause of the delay was that the fractured limestone was caving into the 
hole and Richins was unable to lift the cuttings out. Id. On June 10, 2002, Van King, the 
hydrogeologist who had lobbied for the flooded-reverse-circulation method from the 
beginning—again suggested that this method be used to advance the hole, but Kerry 
Richins rejected this suggestion. Id. Richins proposed that a larger injection tank and 
pump be procured instead. Id. He then performed no work at the site from June 11 to 
June 27, 2002, while he awaited the arrival of the new tank and pump. (R. 588-89) 
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On June 28, 2002, work recommenced using the new tank and pump, but by this 
time, they were rapidly losing ground - the well had lost 126 feet of depth due to 
sloughing and caving. (R. 588). On June 29, 2002, Richins Drilling progressed only 8 
feet, and two days later, more repairs caused work to stop. Id. Richins Drilling did no 
work on the well from July 2 to July 11, 2002. Id. Beginning to panic, Golf Services 
insisted that Richins provide a date certain that the well would be completed as well as a 
set price for completion. Id. When Richins refused, Golf Services terminated Richins. 
id" 
Golf Services immediately hired Lang Drilling to complete the hole. Id. Lang 
mobilized on July 19, 2002 and, using the flooded-reverse-circulation method, drilled 340 
feet in three days, completing the well. Id. 
Golf Services called Randy Mayer as an expert witness. (R. 587). In his capacity 
as contract manager for Lang Drilling, a large drilling company with experience in the 
oil, gas, water well, and mining industries, Mayer reviewed the daily drilling reports for 
at least 16 rigs, and supervised the mobilization and work of those systems in the field. 
Id. He, with Lang, performed those services in completing the well at issue here. Id. 
Mayer testified that Richins Drilling did not use generally accepted practices and 
methods customary in the drilling industry, in a number of critical areas. Id. First, 
6
 Other problems, of Richins' own making, caused delays. Besides having 
equipment that was overwhelmed by the project and constantly breaking down, he was 
woefully understaffed - during the first three weeks of drilling, Richins Drilling had only 
two workers on site—Kerry Richins, and his brother James Richins. Id. Then, from 
March 26, to July 11, 2005, only Kerry Richins and the unlicensed Joe Wright (a 
truckdriver by profession) worked the site. Id. From March 26 to the first week of June, 
Wright was not a licensed driller. Id. 
1 
Mayer testified Richins crews were inadequate for the job. Efficient drilling requires 
crews on site consisting of not less than 2-4 employees. Id. One person working alone 
cannot drill while at the same time perform the collateral activities necessary to advance 
the well—mixing drill fluids, monitoring the compressors, and installing the next drill 
rod. Id. 
Second, the well should have been dug in a single pass with a 17.5" bit from top to 
bottom (rather than, as Richins did, with three passes.) Id. Mayer testified that Richins 
was incorrect in his belief that drilling an initial pilot hole with a lighter-smaller bit, then 
expanding that hole, would minimize deviation; rather, using a 17.5" bit and drill 
assembly that was heavier and more rigid, would cut a straighter hole. Id. Mayer's 
testimony was confirmed by Van King of StanTech, who testified that the amount of 
deviation in the first 800 feet of the well as drilled by Richins far exceeded industry 
standards, i.e. Richins' hole was crooked and, predictably, continued that way into the 
production zone of the well. (R. 586-87). 
Third, Richins could not get the cuttings out of the hole because he had 
compression equipment (to create uphole velocity) that was not up to the task. (R. 586). 
The consequence was the cave-ins in June (confirmed by Richins himself) that reversed 
his progress — the cuttings remained in the hole "boiling" or churning, ultimately 
impeding any advancement of the hole whatsoever from late May until Richins was 
terminated. (R. 586; R. 831 at 200:7-8) 
Fourth, Richins' other equipment was inadequate. Mayer made plain that weight 
of the drilling bit, affects drilling efficiency (by putting pressure on the formation being 
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drilled, which keeps the drill rod straight). (R. 586). Richins Drilling, while in the first 
800 feet of the hole applied adequate weight on the 12.25 and 17.5 inch drill assemblies, 
for the 26-inch assembly, applied only 18,000 pounds, when a minimum of 38,000 
pounds was required. Id. In the production zone below 800 feet, Richins applied only 
12,000 pounds, when a minimum of 24,500 pounds was required, contributing to 
Richins' lack of progress during the latter part of the project. (R. 585-86). 
Fifth, Richins was unable to be flexible, responding to subsurface conditions. (R. 
585). Specifically, when there was no progress using the conventional rotary method 
with air and foam, Richins should have converted to flooded-reverse-circulation. Id. 
Mayer testified that municipal water wells are routinely drilled using the flooded-reverse-
circulation method, without damage to the water-producing formations. Id. Van King 
confirmed that the flooded-reverse-circulation method, combined with subsequent well-
development efforts, does not damage water quality or production capacity. Id. 
Finally, Mayer testified that, using adequate equipment, labor, and drilling 
method, the well at issue should have been completed in "less than 30 days, top to 
bottom." Id. As to cost, Mayer stated that the actual value of Richins' work did not 
exceed $200,000.00. Id} 
Mayer reached this conclusion by examining for the entire project the cost per 
foot and the cost per cubic foot of material removed. Id. 
o 
Assuming a 17.5 inch hole, Richins Drilling drilled 1.12 feet per hour at a cost of 
$263.00 per foot. Id. Richins Drilling removed 3,100 cubic feet of material from the 
hole at a cost of $158.00 per cubic foot. Id. Lang removed 569 cubic feet of material at a 
cost of $82.00 per cubic foot. Id. 
9 
B. The Lawsuit 
As noted, after being paid fully $465,462.55, Richins Drilling sued for the balance 
of a single outstanding invoice of $76,670.34, arguing breach of contract, unjust 
enrichment, foreclosure of mechanic's lien and failure to obtain a payment bond. (R. 1-
52). Defendants counterclaimed, asserting, inter alia, that the time that Richins spent on 
the project (four months) was unreasonable, excessive and far exceeded industry 
standards and that Richins Drilling failed to use the "reverse rotary" method of drilling, 
resulting in Plaintiff billing Defendant an excessive and unreasonable amount. (R. 72-
85). 
Days before trial, the parties settled the counterclaim for $15,000.00 and the 
counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice with each party to pay their own costs and 
attorney's fees. Release of All Counterclaims ("the Release"), Addendum C to Brief of 
Appellant, R. 614-15; R. 525-27; 528-530. 
On May 16, 2005, the case proceeded to a four-day trial. (R. 831-34). At trial, the 
court heard parol evidence as to the issue of whether the form contract was intended by 
the parties to be a complete expression of the agreement, with the intention of later 
resolving the issue of whether the contract was integrated. (R. 831 at 114:16-115:3). 
After the trial, the court found in favor of Defendants on all causes of action, as 
follows: (i) Richins Drilling had breached the contract for failure to perform, thereby 
excusing performance by Defendants,9 and (ii) it denied Richins Drilling's mechanic's 
9
 Specifically, in finding that Plaintiff was in material breach of the contract, the 
court held that Plaintiff was in material breach of 1) the implied provision that the 
10 
lien claim concluding that Defendants had already compensated Richins Drilling far in 
excess of the value of the labor performed, thereby (iii) finding that Defendant Golf 
Services, as the "prevailing party," was per the statute entitled to recover reasonable 
attorney's fees, to be determined by the Court. (R. 579-596). 
Thereafter, counsel for Defendants submitted a number of affidavits in support of 
attorney's fees and costs including, pursuant to specific requests by the court, one that 
differentiated between fees incurred for successful claims and claims for which there is 
no entitlement to fees (the counterclaim). (R. 598-601; 630-680; 737-777; 789-792). 
One of these affidavits (R. 737-777) sought recovery of an expert witness fee in the 
amount of $4,987.00. (R. 738). Plaintiff failed to object to the $4,987.00 expert witness 
fee. SeeR. 779-785. 
On May 1, 2006, the trial court issued a ruling, recognizing that Defendants were 
entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the mechanic's lien statute and 
pursuant to written terms of the contract and that the attorney's fees sought by Golf 
Services were reasonable and adequately allocated to successful claims and claims for 
which no entitlement exists. Ruling Awarding Attorney's Fees to Defendants, R. 796-
804, attached hereto as "Addendum A." Significantly, the trial court also held that 
Plaintiff waived any argument that it was afforded "broader protection against liability 
contract be performed within a reasonable time, 2) the express provision that Plaintiffs 
performance must conform to industry standards (contract at ^ 19.1), and 3) the express 
contractual duty to exert "every reasonable effort" to overcome difficulties associated 
with formations (contract, f 12). (R. 582-84). In arriving at this conclusion, the court 
relied heavily on the expert testimony of Randy Mayer. See id. 
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for attorney's fees" under the Release of All Counterclaims "than that permitted under 
Utah statutes and case law." (R. 803 n.l, Addendum A hereto). On September 18, 2006, 
the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded Defendant Golf 
Services $103,614.23 in attorney's fees. (R. 816-19). 
On October 18, 2006, Plaintiff Richins Drilling filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. 
822-823). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Ruling of the trial court must be affirmed because Plaintiff materially 
breached three duties under the drilling contract: 1) the duty to perform within a 
reasonable time, 2) the duty to comply with industry standards, and 3) the duty to exert 
every reasonable effort to overcome difficulties associated with formations. These three 
material breaches of the contract, none of which contradict the language of the contract 
that the work be done on an "hourly, time and materials basis" (which actually regarded 
the basis of payment), excused Defendants from further performance. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not improperly rely on parol evidence in making 
its determination that Plaintiff was in material breach of the contract. Instead, the court 
relied on the expert testimony of Randy Mayer who provided evidence of the industry 
standards and the reasonable time in which to have completed the project. 
As to attorney's fees, Plaintiff is precluded from arguing that the court erred in 
interpreting the Release of All Counterclaims because the trial court expressly held that 
Plaintiff had waived such an argument. Similarly, Plaintiff failed to preserve its claim 
disputing a $4,987.00 expert witness fee. 
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Finally, Defendants, as the prevailing party under the contract and the mechanic's 
lien statute, are entitled to attorney's fees if they prevail on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY ADD TERMS TO THE 
CONTRACT OR CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff argues, wrongly, that the trial court erred when it "gave [Defendant] a 
better contract than it made for itself," by adding into the contract a "time for 
completion," "a method" and "a maximum price." See Brief of Appellant at 14. Rather, 
pursuant to the contract, Plaintiff had a duty to complete the well within a reasonable 
time, to comply with industry standards and to exert every reasonable effort to overcome 
difficulties associated with formations. Because Plaintiff failed to satisfy those three 
duties, Plaintiff was in material breach of the contract and, therefore, Defendants were 
excused from further performance. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Impose a Time for Completion 
into the Contract 
First, Plaintiff maintains that the contract does not "provide any completion date" 
and, consequently, the trial court's determination that the contract must be performed 
within a reasonable time was contrary to the "plain terms of the Contract" that the work 
"be done on an 'hourly, time and materials basis' and with payment at the applicable 
daywork rate in the event of a termination." Brief of Appellant at 14-15. 
That contracts be performed within a reasonable time is both common-sensical 
and a well-settled part of contract law. "In an attempt to give effect to the intent of the 
parties, the settled rule is that if a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law 
13 
implies that it shall be done within a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter 
& Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998). In fact, "[a]n implied 
reasonable time limit is as much a part of the agreement as those terms that are 
expressed." Id. "When a contract does not specify a time for performance, that 
ordinarily does not render the contract ambiguous; the law implies a reasonable time." 
DSP Venture Group, Inc. v. Allen, 830 A.2d 850, 852-53 (D.C. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis 
added). 
Based upon this well-settled rule, the court below concluded that Plaintiff was 
required to complete the well in a timely fashion. See R. 582-84. This "reasonable time" 
requirement hardly runs contrary, as Plaintiff asserted, to the "plain terms" of the contract 
- that the work be done on an "hourly time and materials basis."10 In any event, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & 
Associates, Inc., 785 F.2d 877 (1986), is noteworthy. In Edward Leasing, a repairer of 
ships sought to recover unpaid repair bills. See id. at 878. "[The repair] work was to be 
done on a time and materials basis with no fixed time for completion"" Id. at 889 
(emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit held that "the record supports the [district] 
court's conclusion that [the repair work] was not completed 'within a reasonable time'" 
and that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in dismissing the claim. See id. at 889-
890 (emphasis added). Thus, as indicated in Edward Leasing, the requirement that the 
Indeed, one has nothing to do with the other since the "time and materials basis" 
pertained solely to the method/measure of payment - i.e. time and materials as opposed 
to a per foot basis of payment. 
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contract be performed within a reasonable time does not contradict the "plain term" that 
the work be done on an "hourly time and materials basis." 
Accordingly, in the case here, because a duty to perform within a reasonable time 
was an implied term of the contract, the trial court neither added terms to the contract, nor 
erred when it found that Plaintiff failed to perform under the contract in a timely manner. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Impose a Method of Drilling into 
the Contract. 
Second, regarding the method of drilling, Plaintiff is again incorrect in its 
ridiculous assertion that because the contract "does not reference whether Richins 
Drilling should comply with industry standards," Plaintiff cannot be held to that standard. 
See Brief of Appellant at 13. 
To the contrary, the contract explicitly required that Richins Drilling comply with 
industry standards. The contract - which Richins Drilling itself drew up - reads, in part, 
as follows: 
In the performance of the work herein contemplated, Contractor 
[Richins Drilling] is an Independent Contractor, with the authority to 
control and direct the performance of the details of the work, 
Operator [Golf Services] being only interested in the results 
obtained. The work shall meet the approval of the Operator [Golf 
Services] and be subject to the right of inspection and supervision 
herein provided. Operator [Golf Services] shall not unreasonably 
withhold approval of all such work, when performed by Contractor 
[Richins Drilling] in accordance with the generally accepted 
practices and methods customary in the industry. 
(R. 688, Addendum B to Brief of Appellant, If 19.1 (emphasis added); R. 583). 
Curiously, Plaintiff actually recognized such a duty under the contract in its 
Statement of Facts. See Brief of Appellant at 8 ("[u]nder the Contract, Richins Drilling 
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had a duty to perform the work 'in accordance with the generally accepted practices and 
methods customary in the industry'"). Furthermore, the contract expressly required that 
Plaintiff exert "every reasonable effort to overcome" difficulties associated with 
formations. (R. 691, Addendum B to Brief of Appellant, f^ 12; R.583). Based on these 
two express duties and the testimony of Randy Mayer, the trial court found that Richins 
Drilling failed to "[c]onvert in a reasonable time to flooded reverse circulation method of 
drilling." (R. 582-83). Because the contract expressly contained these duties, such duties 
were not derived from extrinsic evidence and the trial court did not err.11 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Impose a "Maximum Price" into 
the Contract. 
Third, Plaintiff is incorrect in its assertion that the trial court read a "maximum 
price" into the contract. See Brief of Appellant at 14. It is well-settled that a material 
breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by the non-breaching 
In any event, even had the contract not expressly contained a provision requiring 
compliance with industry standards, such a duty would still have been an implied term of 
the contract. 
Trade usage or custom is permissible to explain technical terms in 
contracts to which particular meanings attach; to make certain that 
which is indefinite, ambiguous or obscure; to supply necessary 
matters upon which the contract itself is silent; and generally to 
elucidate the intention of the parties when the meaning of the 
contract cannot be clearly ascertained from the language. 
Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that evidence of fast-food advertising industry standards was properly admitted in breach 
of contract matter); see also Iron Horse Engineering Co., Inc. v. Northwest Rubber 
Extruders, Inc., 89 P.3d 1249, 1259 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the implied 
covenant of "good faith and fair dealing involves industry standards and practices that 
attach to agreements entered into by the parties"). 
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party. Holbrookv. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
As mentioned, Plaintiff materially 6reacfted three provisions of the contract: 1) it failed to 
perform under the contract within a reasonable time, 2) it failed to comply with industry 
standards, and 3) it failed to exert every reasonable effort to overcome difficulties 
associated with formations. See R. 582-84. The trial court held that because of those 
failures by Plaintiff, Defendant was excused from performance, i.e. from completing 
payment to Plaintiff. See id. Simply put, the court did not find Plaintiff in breach of a 
"maximum price" provision. 
This being so, for all the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not add terms to the 
contract by improperly considering extrinsic evidence. 
ii. THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ARRIVING 
AT ITS CONCLUSION WAS OUTSIDE TftE SCOPE OF THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE RULE. 
Plaintiff argues that "it was error for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence 
regarding the parties' intentions" without making a finding as to whether the contract was 
integrated. Brief of Appellant at 15. Plaintiff further argues that the court considered 
"extrinsic evidence about whether Richins Drilling complied with industry standards and 
whether the total price charged for the well was reasonable." Id. at 13. In fact, the 
evidence relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Plaintiff was in 
material breach of the contract was outside the scope of the parol evidence rule. 
The Utah Supreme Court "has held that as a principle of contract interpretation, 
the parol evidence rule has only a narrow application." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). "Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence 
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of invalidating causes such as fraud or illegality, to exclude evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Id. (emphasis added). 
As explained in Section I above, the terms of the contract providing that the 
contract must be performed within a reasonable time, in accordance with industry 
standards and that Plaintiff must exert "every reasonable effort to overcome" difficulties 
associated with formations, were not derived through extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, 
the specifics as to what constituted a "reasonable time," what constitutes "industry 
standards" and what constitutes reasonable efforts to overcome difficulties associated 
with formations, were outside the scope of the parol evidence rule. The following 
passage from the trial court's Ruling is illuminating: 
The Court concludes that Richins Drilling was in material breach of 
both of these contractual duties [the duty to comply with industry 
standards and the duty to exert every reasonable effort to overcome 
difficulties associated with formations]. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court grants credence to the testimony of [expert witness] Mr. 
Mayer. Specifically, Richins Drilling failed to: 
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Indeed, other jurisdictions have recognized that parol evidence is, by definition, 
evidence of "prior or contemporaneous" agreements. See, e.g., Luttrell v. Cooper 
Industries, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 629, 631 (E.D. Ky. 1998) ("[p]arol evidence consists of 
evidence of agreements between or the behavior of the parties prior to or 
contemporaneous with the contract"); Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A. v. Hodder, 144 
P.3d 401, 412 n.5 (Wyo. 2006) ("'[p]arol evidence' refers to prior or contemporaneous 
collateral agreements of the parties or their understanding of what particular terms in 
their agreement mean"); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 443 F.Supp.2d 703, 715 
(E.D. Pa. 2006) ("[p]arol evidence is extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral 
agreements, or prior written agreements...." (citation and internal quotation omitted)); 
Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 966 P.2d 23, 28 (Idaho 1998) ("[p]arol evidence is any...written or 
oral agreements or understandings.. .made prior to or contemporaneously with the written 
contract" (citation and internal quotation omitted)). 
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1. Provide adequate on site crews during drilling; 
2. Provide adequate air compression to lift the 
cuttings out of the hole; 
3. Provide adequate weight on the bit to advance 
the hole, both in the non-production and production 
zones of the well; 
4. Convert in a reasonable time to flooded reverse 
circulation method of drilling; and 
5. Complete the well timely. 
(R. 582-83). 
The testimony of expert witness Randy Mayer is outside the scope of the parol 
evidence rule because it was not evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or 
discussions. Thus, in making its determination that Plaintiff was in material breach of the 
contract, it was not necessary for the trial court to make a determination as to whether the 
contract was integrated.13 
The trial court did not improperly rely on parol evidence to interpret the contract 
and the trial court's Ruling must be affirmed. 
Defendants acknowledge that the trial court heard parol evidence at trial. 
However, "[i]n determining whether the writing was intended by the parties to be a 
complete expression of the agreement, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is 
admissible." Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, \ 15, 155 P.3d 917. The trial court in 
the present matter recognized that parol evidence was admissible for this purpose and 
intended to later resolve the issue of whether the contract was integrated. See R. 831 at 
114:16-115:3. However, based on Bennett, whether parol evidence is admissible and 
whether it may ultimately be considered to be a part of the contract are two separate 
matters. While the trial court cited parol evidence in its Findings of Fact, the court did 
not rely on this evidence in its Conclusions of Law; instead, the court relied on the expert 
testimony of Randy Mayer, which is outside the scope of the parol evidence rule. Thus, 
it was unnecessary for the trial court to make a determination as to whether the contract 
was integrated, and any failure of the trial court to make such a determination, was 
harmless error. 
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III. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESERVE ITS CLAIM THAT THE RELEASE 
OF ALL COUNTERCLAIMS AFFORDED IT BROADER PROTECTION 
AGAINST LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES THAN THAT 
PERMITTED BY UTAH STATUTES AND CASE LAW. 
Plaintiff is precluded from arguing that the trial court committed error when it 
interpreted the Release of All Counterclaims to not be a release of those attorney's fees 
that were "related to" the Counterclaim. Simply put, Plaintiff failed to preserve the 
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issue. 
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, \ 14, 48 P.3d 968. "[T]hree 
specific factors.. .help determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: '(1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) 
a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" Id. (quoting 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Indeed, "[i]t is axiomatic 
that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show that it 
was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis in 
original). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived, 
precluding this court from considering their merits on appeal." Id. 
Notably, the trial court found that Defendants were entitled to attorney's fees 
pursuant to statute as the "prevailing party" on the mechanic's lien claim and pursuant to 
the written terms of the contract. See R. 796-804; 730-34. 
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Plaintiff framed the issue as "whether the phrase 'relating to' was interpreted 
correctly by the trial court," see Brief of Appellant at 18, maintaining that the trial court 
incorrectly relied on federal case law and Dejavue v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 
355, Tf 20, 993 P.2d 222, because those cases do not specifically involve a release (yet 
Plaintiff fails to provide cases that do address a "release"). See Brief of Appellant at 20. 
The trial court explicitly noted Plaintiffs failure to preserve the issue. In its 
Ruling Awarding Attorney's Fees to Defendants (R. 796-804) which Plaintiff ignores, the 
court noted the following: 
The Court need not determine what the parties intended by using the 
phrase 'attorneys fees relating to counterclaim.' Richins Drilling has 
never contended that the release afforded it broader protection 
against liability for attorney's fees than that permitted under Utah 
statutes and case law. Therefore, any such argument is waived. 
(R. 803 n.l) (emphasis added).15 
Because Plaintiff did not timely and specifically raise the issue before the trial 
court, this Court is precluded from hearing Plaintiffs argument on appeal. 
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had properly preserved the issue for appeal, 
Plaintiffs argument would still fail. The trial court's determination of the amount of 
attorney's fees to award is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Moore v. Smith, 
2007 UT App 101, \ 53, 158 P.3d 562. More specifically, when two claims are 
intertwined, one that warrants attorney's fees and one that does not, it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to award attorney's fees incurred in presenting all legal 
15
 A full copy of the Ruling Awarding Attorney's Fees to Defendants is attached 
hereto as "Addendum A." 
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theories. See Dejavue, ^ 20-21. In a case similar to the one here, Sprouse v. Jager, 806 
P.2d 219, 226 (Utah Ct. App.1991), the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding the full amount of attorney's fees claimed by counsel, 
despite a challenge to the trial court's failure to deduct the two-thirds of attorney time 
that was not directly attributed to the issue with recoverable attorney's fees. Even while 
the attorney provided a breakdown of his fees into thirds - between that issue that 
explicitly warranted attorney's fees and two others that did not - the appellate court 
deferred to the trial court's determination that, "the[] complex issues were so intertwined, 
[] the [trial] court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney fees"- on the entire 
amount incurred on all three issues. Id. 
Plaintiff presses its argument by altering the language of the Release, contending 
that if the fees and costs at issue were "in any way related to, associated, concerned or 
were connected with" the counterclaim, they are not recoverable. See Brief of Appellant 
at 20 (emphasis added). Yet, the language of the Release fails to go that far. See Release 
of All Counterclaims, attached to Brief of Appellant as "Addendum C," R. 614-15. 
Indeed, the true intent of the parties when drafting the Release is apparent from the fact 
that Defendants received only $15,000.00 upon the settlement of the counterclaim. See 
R. 615. With over $100,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs assessed in this matter, that 
fact makes apparent that the parties did not intend to release Plaintiff from liability for all 
attorney's fees and costs relevant to the defense which might also be somewhat related to 
the counterclaim. 
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Thus, it was within the sound discretion of the trial court to award Defendants 
attorney's fees that were intertwined with the counterclaim. 
IV. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWED 
DEFENDANTS TO RECOVER COSTS RELATED TO AN EXPERT 
WITNESS. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that this matter must be remanded in order identify the 
name of an expert witness unidentified in Defendants' affidavit for fees and costs. See 
Brief of Appellant at 22. This argument fails because Plaintiff failed to preserve the issue 
for appeal. As noted in Section III, supra, "in order to preserve an issue for appeal the 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd., supra, [^14. 
Plaintiff cites R. 624-25, 716-722 and 779-785 in support of its contention that it 
preserved issues relating to attorney's fees for appeal. However, nowhere in the cited 
record does Plaintiff make a specific objection to the $4,987.00 expert witness fee that it 
now disputes. Indeed, Plaintiff had the opportunity to bring the specific disputed fee to 
the attention of the trial court in its Second Objection to Defendant's Claimed Attorney 
Fees and Costs, but failed to do so. See R. 779-785. Accordingly, because Plaintiff 
failed to preserve the issue, the matter cannot be remanded to the trial court. 
V. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL 
In Utah, attorney's fees may be awarded based on a contract between the parties. 
Meadowbrook, LLC. v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1998). The contract in this 
case, drafted by Plaintiff, required payment of fees to the prevailing party as follows: 
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If this Contract is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection of 
any sums due hereunder, or suit is brought on the same, or sums due 
hereunder are collected through bankruptcy or arbitration 
proceedings, then the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
(R. 688, Addendum B to Brief of Appellant, 126). 
The trial court recognized that Defendants were entitled to attorney's fees as the 
prevailing party under the terms of the contract. (R. 802-803). In addition, Defendants 
were entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the mechanic's lien claim. (R. 796-804). 
Thus, they were awarded attorney's fees by the trial court. (R. 816-19). 
This being so, Defendants are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal. See Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) (agreement that permitted recovery of attorney's fees by prevailing party 
in the event of a legal proceeding to enforce the provisions thereof, entitled prevailing 
party to attorney's fees incurred on appeal where the issues on appeal dealt with 
enforcement of the agreement); Management Services Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 
P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980) (where appellees were required to defend their position on 
appeal at their own expense and because their position was based on a contractual 
provision allowing for attorney fees, the established rule is to award attorney's fees for 
the cost of appeal); Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1988) (same); and 
ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, If 32, 998 P.2d 254 ("[o]ur law provides 
that a party which successfully defends an appeal that arose out of a cause of action under 
a mechanic's lien is entitled to the attorney fees spent on appeal"). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed and 
Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees incurred as a result of Plaintiff s appeal. 
DATED this [ day of October, 2007. 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
u 
Gail E(j^s iser 
Bradley~J. Neese 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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A. Ruling Awarding Attorney's Fees to Defendants 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHINS DRILLING, INC., 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GOLF SERVICES GROUP, INC., TUHAYE 
LLC, FIDELITY BANK, HIGH COUNTRY 
TITLE, and DOES 1-25, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
TO DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 020500464 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
Almost one year has passed since this case came to trial and the dispute regarding 
attorney's fees persists. At the Court's direction, counsel for Defendants Tuhaye, L.L.C. and 
Golf Services Group, Inc. (collectively "GSG") filed a third fees affidavit. Plaintiff Richins 
Drilling, Inc. challenges the sufficiency of that affidavit. 
CASE HISTORY 
Procedural Background 
1. This matter came before the Court for bench trial on May 16-19, 2005. Richins Drilling, 
was represented by Mr. Daniel S. Sam. GSG was represented by Ms. Gail E. Laser. 
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2. On June 15, 2005, the Court issued its ruling granting judgment in favor of GSG. 
3. The Court awarded attorneys fees to GSG because it had successfully defended Richins 
Drilling's claim for a mechanic's lien. At the direction of the Court, GSG filed a fees 
affidavit. 
4. Richins Drilling objected to the affidavit because (1) GSG had released Richins Drilling 
from liability for attorneys fees relating to GSG's counterclaim; and (2) the fees affidavit 
failed to differentiate between attorneys fees incurred for successful claims and claims for 
which there is no entitlement for fees. 
5. On February 1, 2006 the Court issued its Ruling Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees. 
The Court ruled: 
GSG is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to the terms of the written contract. Richins Drilling 
brought suit on the contract and GSG prevailed. GSG is also 
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees for successfully 
defending against the mechanic's lien claim. However, GSG 
released Richins Drilling from liability for attorney's fees incurred 
in prosecuting the counterclaim.1 
A party seeking attorney's fees must allocate its request for fees, 
differentiating between the fees incurred for successful claims (the 
contract and mechanic's lien claims) and claims for which there is 
]The parties entered into an agreement entitled "Release of All Counterclaims." That 
document provides: 
Releasors [GSG] understand and agree that this is a release of all 
counterclaims against all Releasees [Richins Drilling] . . . and 
includes, but is not limited to, claims for property damages of any 
kind or character, loss of business, attorneys fees relating to 
counterclaim, and claims for loss of time, wages, income or profits. 
The Court need not determine what the parties intended by using the phrase "attorneys fees 
relating to counterclaim." Richins Drilling has never contended that the release afforded it 
broader protection against liability for attorney's fees than that permitted under Utah statutes and 
case law. Therefore, any such argument is waived. 
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no entitlement for fees (the counterclaim). A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const, 977 P.2d 518 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). Neither the initial nor the supplemental fees affidavit 
conforms to this standard. 
The Court directs that an amended fees affidavit be filed with the 
Court which conforms to this Ruling and the requirements of Rule 
73. The amended affidavit shall be submitted within 30 days from 
the date of this Ruling. 
On March 15, 2006, GSG file an amended affidavit in support of attorney's fees. 
On March 31, 2006, Richins Drilling filed its objection. 
On April 21, 2006, GSG filed its reply. 
GSG has requested oral argument. However, the relevant issues have been adequately 
briefed and the Court is not persuaded that oral argument would be of further assistance. 
The Underlying Claims 
Richins Drilling alleged four causes of action in its complaint: (1) breach of contract, (2) 
unjust enrichment, (3) mechanic's lien, and (4) payment bond. 
GSG alleged nine causes of action in its counterclaim: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) fiduciary duties, (4) promissory 
estoppel, (5) unjust enrichment, (6) fraud, (7) negligent misrepresentation, (8) fraud in the 
inducement, and (9) negligence. 
Five days before trial, the parties settled the counterclaim. Thus, the trial proceeded 
solely on the allegations made in Richins Drilling's complaint. 
The Amended Fees Affidavit 
In the amended fees affidavit, GSG attaches the billing statement of its law firm which 
allocates fees and costs by color code. 
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14. Those fees and costs allocated to the counterclaim are highlighted in orange. It is 
undisputed that these fees—which total $2,841.65—are not recoverable. 
15. Those fees and costs allocated to defending against the contract and mechanic's claims 
are highlighted in yellow. These attorneys fees and costs total $67,531.00 and $31,931.93 
respectively.2 
16. Those fees and costs incurred in furtherance of both GSG's defense and counterclaim are 
highlighted in pink. These attorneys fees and costs total $15,586.00 and $770.40 
respectively. GSG seeks only one-half of all fees and costs highlighted in pink, or 
$7,793.00 in attorneys fees and $385.20 in costs. 
17. Therefore, GSG seeks total attorneys fees in the amount of $75,324.00 and total costs in 
the amount of $32,317.13. 
RULING 
"One who seeks an award of attorney fees . . . has the burden of producing evidence to 
buttress the requested award." Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme 
Court has "mandated that a party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its 
underlying claims. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees expended for . . . 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, . . . and . . . claims for 
which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.'" Id. 
While allocation is generally required, Courts have recognized an exception to this rule 
where successful and unsuccessful claims are "'inextricably intertwined' and 'involve a common 
core of facts or are based on related legal theories.'" Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 
2GSG concedes that the filing fee of $90.00 for the counterclaim is not recoverable. 
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1170, 1183 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 822 F.2d 
1249, 1259 (2d Cir. 1987)) (alteration omitted); see also, Deiavue v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 
222, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), cert, denied 4 P.3d (Utah 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart. 461 
U.S. 424, 435 (1983). 
In the instant case, Richins Drilling agreed to drill a water well for GSG. When a dispute 
arose about performance and payment, Richins Drilling filed a mechanic's lien against GSG's 
property and brought suit for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. GSG's counterclaims 
included breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair-dealing, unjust 
enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The Court concludes that the causes of action in the 
complaint and the counterclaim involved a common core of facts and are grounded in the same 
legal theories. In many instances, attorney's fees incurred by GSG to defend against the 
complaint, invariably advanced GSG's counterclaims. 
Recognizing this reality, the Court turns to the objections of Richins Drilling. Richins 
Drilling first contends that including virtually all deposition fees and costs for lay and expert 
witnesses is inappropriate. Richins Drilling argues that while these witnesses testified at trial, the 
depositions were originally noticed by attorney John Lund who defended Richins Drilling against 
GSG's counterclaim. 
Whatever the original motivation for taking these depositions, GSG called the deposed 
witnesses at trial and their testimony was fundamentally tied to GSG's defense. Therefore, the 
Court concludes that GSG is entitled to recover deposition fees and costs.3 
3GSG does not seek to recover fees and costs incurred in deposing James Richins and 
Gordon Perry. 
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Richins Drilling argues that attorney's fees incurred by GSG at the onset of the litigation 
(from 7/16/02 to 9/28/02) should not be allowed because the fees were "clearly investigatory for 
the purpose of devising a defense strategy, including counterclaims." It is difficult to ascertain 
the factual basis for this conclusory assertion. In any event, attorney's fees incurred to "devise a 
defense strategy" would by definition be unrelated to the prosecution of counterclaims. 
While Richins Drilling did not file the complaint until September 18, 2002, the 
mechanic's lien which gave rise to this action was filed approximately two months earlier on July 
26, 2002. Attorney's fees incurred by GSG before the date the mechanic's lien was 
recorded—totaling $180.00—cannot be recovered. However fees incurred after the filing of the 
lien and before the filing of the complaint—whether to pursue early settlement or mount an 
aggressive defense—are recoverable, so long as (1) the fees are unrelated to the counterclaim, or 
(2) the fees are so factually or legally intertwined with the counterclaim that no meaningful 
allocation can be made. The Court concludes that these fees fall within this second category. 
Richins Drilling next argues that 100% of certain itemized fees were arbitrarily allocated 
solely to defense of the complaint. Specifically, Richins Drilling complains that (1) investigation 
of the "reverse rotary method" of drilling advanced the counterclaim; (2) legal work related to the 
contract advanced both GSG's defense and its counterclaims; (3) Van King, GSG's expert 
witness, was retained to advance the counterclaim; (4) the Widdison video-tape of the well 
related to the counterclaim; and (5) trial preparation fees incurred up to May 11, 2005 (the date 
the counterclaims were dismissed) was as much related to the counterclaims as to GSG's 
defense. 
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The Court is not persuaded by these arguments. As stated, many of the causes of action 
in the counterclaim and in the complaint are not factually or legally distinct. In these 
circumstances, fees incurred to advance GSG's counterclaims invariably were related to and 
advanced GSG's defense. Trial preparation to prosecute was preparation to defend. Allocating 
100% of the foregoing fees—including trial preparation fees—is appropriate. 
Richins Drilling argues that post-trial fees incurred to litigate the question of attorney's 
fees are not recoverable. The Court agrees. Had GSG in its initial fee affidavits made any 
attempt to allocate costs, the lengthy dispute over attorney's fees might well have been shortened, 
or avoided altogether. From the record, GSG began to incur these fees on June 21, 2005. From 
that day through January 31, 2006, GSG incurred $3,280.00 in fees related to the recovery of 
attorneys fees. This amount is not recoverable. 
Richins Drilling contends that GSG's fifty-fifty allocation of some fees is arbitrary. 
Recognizing the factual and legal nexus between the complaint and counterclaims, the Court 
finds that GSG has where possible identified instances in which allocation to its defense and to 
the counterclaims can be made. The allocation of one-half of these expenses to the counterclaim 
is reasonable, given the common core of facts and related legal theories. 
Finally, the Court is not of the view that charges for meals and lodging are in this case 
recoverable as costs. These costs total $566.90.4 
With the exceptions noted herein, the Court finds that the attorneys fees and costs 
claimed are reasonable. This case was factually complex and required counsel to become well-
4See charges for 5/12/05 ($7.05), 5/3/05 ($14.63), 8/27/04 ($47.94) 2/29/04 ($481.79); 
2/13/04 ($15.49). 
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versed in the practices of the drilling industry. Expert witnesses were required. The litigation 
commenced in September 2002 and culminated in a five-day bench trial almost three years later. 
During that time, counsel for GSG billed approximately 500 hours of time. At stake was GSG's 
liability for some $76,000.00 plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs, and damages recoverable 
on the counterclaim which ultimately settled. The attorneys working billed a reasonable fee 
(between $120.00 and $185.00 per hour) given their experience and the complexity of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the totality of these circumstances and with the exceptions noted herein, the Court 
concludes that the attorneys fees sought by GSG are reasonable and adequately allocated to 
successful claims and claims for which no entitlement exists. 
Therefore the Court awards attorneys fees to GSG in the amount of $71,864.00 and costs 
in the amount of $31,750.23 . 
The Court requests that counsel for GSG prepare an order and judgment consistent with 
this decision. 
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